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Given the persistent and costly problem of escalating IT projects, it is important to understand how projects can be de-escalated 
successfully, resulting in project turnaround if possible, or termination if necessary. Recent work suggests that the instantiation of 
specific roles may be central in bringing about de-escalation. However, few such roles have been identified to date and there has 
been no systematic study of key roles. In this paper, we therefore explore roles in IT project de-escalation using a single-case 
approach. Results suggest that de-escalation not only depends on the existence of particular roles, but also on role interaction. 
We identify seven roles that are of substantial importance in shaping whether and how de-escalation is carried out: messenger, 
exit sponsor, exit champion, exit blocker, exit catalyst, legitimizer, and scapegoat. Furthermore, we offer a set of propositions that 
capture key role interactions during de-escalation. Implications for research and practice are discussed. 
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Making IT Project De-Escalation Happen: An Exploration 
into Key Roles 
 
1. Introduction 
Regardless of development approach, the risk of failure in information technology (IT) projects is 
significant, especially in circumstances characterized by high problem complexity, substantial 
changes in business processes, innovation in solutions, and environmental uncertainty (Iivari, 1990). 
As a result, IT projects are well known for budget over-runs and schedule slippage; they frequently fail 
to deliver the expected functionality or business benefits; and some projects escalate out of control, 
continuing to absorb valuable resources without ever delivering benefits to the organizations that 
undertake them (Keil, 1995). In fact, a survey sponsored by the Information Systems Audit and 
Control Association (ISACA) found that 30–40 percent of IT projects undergo some degree of project 
escalation (Keil and Mann, 1997).1 Increased knowledge about de-escalation—the termination or 
redirection of an escalating IT project—is therefore important (Keil et al., 2003; Keil and Robey, 1999; 
Montealegre and Keil, 2000; Pan et al., 2006a). 
 
However, turning around a failing course of action is not easy, and studies have shown that 
organizations often pursue projects far beyond the point where costs outweigh benefits (Brockner, 
1992; Staw and Ross, 1978, 1987). Consequently, de-escalation has to be actively managed as a 
complex process (Keil and Robey, 1999; Montealegre and Keil, 2000; Pan et al., 2004; Pan et al., 
2006b). While recent research on de-escalation sheds light on its phases (Montealegre and Keil, 
2000) and transformation of commitment (Pan et al., 2006a; Pan et al., 2004), existing studies offer 
limited insights into how actors are involved in making de-escalation happen (Heng et al., 2003a). 
 
The purpose of this paper is therefore to identify key roles in initiating and executing IT project de-
escalation and to explore role interactions during de-escalation. We accomplish this through a case 
study of the Danish VUE2 project, a high-profile IT project aimed at developing an administration 
system for all Danish universities. Based on the case study, we identify seven roles that are of 
substantial importance in shaping whether and how de-escalation is carried out: messenger, exit 
sponsor, exit champion, exit blocker, exit catalyst, legitimizer, and scapegoat. Furthermore, we offer 
five propositions capturing key role interactions that promote de-escalation. 
 
The following section provides a background of relevant literature, which is followed by a description 
of the research approach and a description of the VUE case focusing on de-escalation. Thereafter, 
we analyze and discuss the case in two steps: identification of key roles and identification of key role 
interactions, including their impacts on de-escalation. The paper ends with conclusions and 
implications. 
2. Background 
This section discusses prior research on de-escalation, the use of the role perspective in IS research, 
and prior studies that address roles in de-escalation.  
2.1. De-escalation Research 
While there has been considerable research on escalation (Keil, 1995; Keil et al., 2000; Staw, 1997; 
Staw and Ross, 1987), research on de-escalation has been limited (Keil and Robey, 1999; Pan et al., 
2004). De-escalation can be defined as “the reversal of escalating commitment to failing courses of 
                                                     
1 While escalation can occur with any type of project, IT projects may be particularly vulnerable due to the 
abstract and uncertain nature of information systems development and implementation (Abdel-Hamid, 1988; 
Brooks, 1975; DeMarco, 1982; Zmud, 1980). Indeed, most IT projects pose a particularly difficult management 
challenge due to a high degree of project complexity related both to technological uncertainty and to breadth of 
project scope (c.f. Kruglianskas and Thamhain, 2000; Shenhar, 1998). Even with packaged software, such as 
ERP systems, there are many examples of spectacular problems (Bulkeley, 1996; Stedman, 1999; Tomsho, 
1994). 
2 VUE is a Danish abbreviation for “Videregaaende Uddannelsers Edb-system,” which can be translated: “IT system 
for further and higher education institutions.” 
 
 
Mähring et al./IT Project De-Escalation 
464 Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 9 Issue 8 pp. 462-496 August 2008 
action, either through project termination or redirection” (Keil and Robey, 1999, p. 65). De-escalation 
has been shown to consist of a number of phases that ultimately result in decisions that lead to 
termination or a substantial re-direction—a turnaround or a partial salvaging—of the project 
(Montealegre and Keil, 2000; Pan et al., 2006b). Isolated attempts to remedy problems that fail to 
substantially change the project charter, the overall approach of project work, or other central aspects 
of the course of action do not constitute a de-escalation effort (Mähring and Keil, 2008).  
 
Keil and Robey (1999) found only 12 empirical studies of de-escalation, most of which were 
laboratory studies. These studies suggest that there are certain factors that promote de-escalation. In 
a field survey involving 42 information systems auditors, Keil and Robey (1999) examined the signi-
ficance of 12 such factors in the transition from escalation to de-escalation, finding empirical support 
for seven factors. Specifically, the transition from escalation to de-escalation was marked by 
significantly less tolerance for failure, more publicly stated limits, more awareness of problems, more 
clarity of criteria for success or failure, more outcome-oriented evaluations, more regular evaluation of 
projects, and more separation of responsibility for approving and evaluating projects. In the same 
study, the researchers offered a simple communication model of de-escalation, based on actors’ 
willingness to report and receive bad news (Keil and Robey, 1999). 
 
Montealegre and Keil (2000) proposed a process model of de-escalation consisting of four phases: 
(1) problem recognition, (2) re-examination of prior course of action, (3) search for alternative course 
of action, and (4) implementing an exit strategy (Table 1).3 However, the model does not address the 
roles that various actors may play in advancing the de-escalation process.  
 
 
                                                     
3 While the model was derived from a single case study—the computerized baggage handling system at 
the Denver International Airport—it was subsequently shown to be applicable to the Taurus project at the 
London Stock Exchange (Keil and Montealegre, 2000), suggesting that the model has some 
generalizability. 
Table 1. Phases in the Montealegre and Keil (2000) De-escalation Process Model 
Phase 1: 
Problem Recognition 
No corrective action can be taken until actors in a position of authority 
begin to acknowledge the problems and their seriousness. Often, what 
can appear to outsiders as an obvious case for withdrawal may not 
outweigh the accumulated commitment of those inside the 
organization, particularly those who have played a role in championing 
the project. In many cases, it appears that either internal or external 
pressure must exist before problem recognition can occur. 
Phase 2: 
Re-examination of 
Prior Course of Action
During this phase, actors begin to question the wisdom of the 
previously chosen course of action and problems are scrutinized, but 




Alternative Course of 
Action 
In this phase, further evidence of problems is often sought and an 
alternative course of action is identified and legitimized. Consultants 
can sometimes help legitimize a new course of action and impression 
management can also facilitate the process. However, the decision to 
embark on a new course is still going to be difficult, especially if it 
results in loss of face for decision-makers. 
Phase 4: 
Implementing an Exit 
Strategy 
Given the political nature of escalating projects, merely identifying an 
alternative course of action is insufficient to bring about change. The 
alternative course must be legitimized and sold to various actors. 
Moreover, all of this needs to be done, if possible, in a way where 
impressions are managed so as to allow face-saving on the part of key 
executives who backed the failing course of action. Implementation of 
the exit strategy can be particularly challenging if certain actors have a 
vested interest in the previously chosen course of action. 
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Royer (2002; 2003) introduced a process model that takes a somewhat different view of de-escalation. 
Her work suggests that escalation stems from collective belief in project infallibility, which creates 
groupthink, cohesiveness of the decision-making unit, and “lenient procedure” (inadequate control 
measures, procedures, and criteria). In Royer’s view, de-escalation occurs when collective belief is 
shattered, newcomers destroy decision unit cohesiveness, and evaluation criteria become based on 
economic rationality (Royer, 2002). This model did not prove stable across the studied cases, and has 
shortcomings (Mähring and Keil, 2003). 
 
Pan and his colleagues (Pan et al., 2006a; Pan et al., 2004) also stress the importance of 
understanding de-escalation as a process, and focus specifically on “commitment transformation”: 
how actors overcome their commitment to a failing course of action and shape commitment toward a 
new course of action (project redirection or termination). Activities that support commitment 
transformation are: disconfirmation of the failing course of action, the project champion’s continuous 
commitment in turning around the failing project, provision of psychological safety for project mem-
bers, development of new attitudes and behaviors by project members, and alignment and integration 
of these new attitudes and behaviors (Pan et al., 2004). 
 
In a laboratory experiment, Heng et al. (2003a) found that blame shouldering and provision of 
assurance by peers and, particularly, by superiors helped facilitate individuals’ de-escalation of 
commitment to a failing course of action when sunk cost was not too high. Their research was 
confined to an individual’s relationships with superiors and peers, but as the first study to explicitly 
address the question of “who matters?” in de-escalation, their paper points to the need for further 
research into the actors that make de-escalation possible. It also suggests that the role perspective 
may provide a promising avenue for exploring this problem. 
 
Two fundamental challenges of escalation and de-escalation research deserve mention although they 
are not the focus of this study. First, the uncertainty inherent in escalation situations means that most 
often we cannot be certain about when a course of action is truly in vain and when more effort might 
yield results (Drummond, 2005). This means that decisions to de-escalate or persist entail two risks: 
of wrongfully terminating what would (or could) have become a successful effort and of continuing to 
fund a doomed endeavor (Drummond, 2005). Management commitment needs to be “appropriate”: 
not enough to cause escalation, but not so little as to lead to premature termination of projects (Heng 
et al., 2003b). Here, we stay with the mainstream view of the literature: Repeated negative feedback 
about the viability of a course of action necessitates de-escalation in the form of either termination or 
redirection, which hopefully leads to an ultimately successful outcome (Brockner, 1992; Montealegre 
and Keil, 2000).  
 
Second, because of this uncertainty, what is escalation and what is a bump in the road to success 
becomes visible only slowly (Mähring and Keil, 2008) and may be determinable with absolute 
certainty only retrospectively. It could be argued that this potentially limits the prescriptive value of 
escalation and de-escalation research. If so, this is a problem shared with areas such as disaster 
studies (Snook, 2000; Vaughan, 1996). Ultimately, the applied value of escalation and de-escalation 
research is determined by the extent to which it provides a basis for practical action.4 
2.2. The Role Perspective in IS Research 
The use of the role concept is not uncommon in IS research. In particular, it has been frequently used 
in IS implementation and IS development research.  
 
Several studies have identified roles that need to be fulfilled to ensure successful implementation of 
information systems (Beath, 1991; Lederer and Nath, 1991; McKenney et al., 1995; Rockart and De 
Long, 1988). Typically, these roles include the sponsor, a senior executive with high authority who 
acts as a type of benefactor for an implementation effort, and the champion, an executive or middle 
manager who actively drives the effort forward through persuading other actors to perform the 
                                                     
4 We thank the senior editor and one anonymous reviewer for pointing us to the importance of these attributes of 
escalation and de-escalation research. 
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necessary tasks for the effort to succeed. Although the names used for these roles sometimes differ, 
the role descriptions have been remarkably stable across studies, whether concerning specific IS 
development projects (Edwards, 1996; Rockart and De Long, 1988) or longer term, corporate-wide IT 
efforts (McKenney et al., 1995).5 An additional role is that of change agent (Markus and Benjamin, 
1996), which includes facilitating work sessions and interventions as well as designing and executing 
participation opportunities for stakeholders (Markus and Mao, 2004). 
 
Research on IS development has also examined key roles and their interaction. In addition to the two 
obvious roles of user and analyst (Barki and Hartwick, 2001; Newman and Robey, 1992), other roles 
have been proposed. Ciborra and Lanzara (1994) suggest the introduction of a reflector or watcher in 
the IS design process to help designers and users carry out self-evaluations and self-reflection (also 
Lanzara and Mathiassen, 1988). Fisher (1999) studied the role of the technical communicator in 
explaining complex technologies to end-users during IS development and how this role improves IS 
usability. Robey et al. (2001) studied four recurrent roles under different software development para-
digms: user, developer, manager, and guarantor (a role that guarantees the quality and suitability of 
an application).  
 
All of the above studies employ the role concept even if they do not employ role theory (Katz and 
Kahn, 1978) to its full extent. Most of the above studies see roles as constituted of patterns of 
actions—related to an individual or group—that have a potential or perceived impact on a course of 
events. Intentionality or deliberate choice by the role incumbent is not seen as necessary for the role 
to be effectuated. This is in line with the common-sense expression “to unwittingly play a role” and 
consistent with how other roles such as boundary spanner have been characterized (Levina and 
Vaast, 2005). 
 
In all of these studies, roles are not positions and roles and actors are distinct: Actors can assume 
several roles, and a specific role can be present in a social context over a long time period during 
which role incumbents may change (Robey et al., 2001). Although roles are normally inhabited by 
individuals or groups, we found that the literature on escalation and de-escalation sometimes 
describes organizations as performing actions related to de-escalation. The Shoreham case (Ross 
and Staw, 1993) describes actions by the Long Island Lighting Company, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, and New York State, while the Denver International Airport Case (Montealegre and Keil, 
2000) describes actions taken by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Aviation 
Administration. 
 
In order to allow for viewing organizations as actors while remaining faithful to the role concept, we 
see organizational action as performed by a dominant coalition of actors (Child, 1972; Cyert and 
March, 1963; Pennings and Woiceshyn, 1987). This group of actors can change over time, but at 
each point in time the active dominant coalition is the group conducting organizational actions. Thus, 
we can see a role emerging from a pattern of organizational actions performed by a dominant 
coalition—a group of individuals effectuating those actions. 
2.3. Roles in De-escalation 
Building on the use of the role concept in the IS implementation and IS development literature 
described above, as well as on Somers and Nelson (2004), we define a de-escalation role as a 
coherent pattern of actions performed by one or several actors during the process of IT project de-
escalation.  
 
Existing research on roles in de-escalation is very limited. Keil and Robey (1999, 2001) studied the 
reporting of bad news about troubled software projects, and suggested the term messenger to denote 
the role of bringing bad news to someone with authority to address the problems. Royer (2003) 
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suggested that de-escalation is dependent on an exit champion, who drives the de-escalation effort.6 
Exit champions question the current course of action, demand data on and assess the viability of a 
project, and act to pull the plug on the failing project. Royer (2003) found that exit champions need to 
be directly involved in a project and must have both credibility and an extensive personal network 
within the organization. Her data suggest that people who become associated with an effort in its later 
phases are more likely to become exit champions (cf., Keil, 1995). Royer (2003) also found that in her 
case studies, project champions opposed de-escalation initiatives and tried to curtail them by 
discrediting people advocating or exploring de-escalation options. 
 
In contrast, a study by Pan and colleagues (2006a, 2004) suggested that the project champion in the 
studied case was crucial in transforming commitment during de-escalation. Pan and colleagues did 
not identify any additional roles. The depiction of the project champion role as crucial in promoting 
(rather than impeding) de-escalation may seem at odds with earlier escalation and de-escalation 
literature (Keil, 1995; Mähring et al., 2004; Montealegre and Keil, 2000; Royer, 2002), which indicates 
an opportunity for clarifying this issue.  
 
In sum, the de-escalation literature is under-developed and somewhat inconsistent with respect to 
roles involved in de-escalation. In fact, no prior study has systematically examined relevant roles in 
de-escalation. Therefore, in this study, we examine key roles and patterns of role interactions with the 
aim of furthering our understanding of how to bring about de-escalation. The role perspective, 
Montealegre and Keil’s (2000) phase model, and the messenger and exit champion roles previously 
identified in the literature are the key theoretical elements that we build on.  
3. Research Approach 
Case studies allow investigation of how phenomena unfold in context and over time (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2003), and they are considered highly appropriate for 
exploratory, theory-building research (Benbasat et al., 1987; Eisenhardt, 1989; Paré, 2004; Yin, 2003). 
Therefore, we used a single case study of the high-profile Danish VUE project—not previously 
reported in the research literature—as the basis for this research. 
3.1. Data Collection 
There was a wealth of readily available data about the VUE project due to public scrutiny and media 
attention. In addition, one of our authors had first-hand knowledge: He participated in project kick-off 
activities as an external expert, he received recurrent project updates as a member of one of the 
universities involved, and he was engaged as an external consultant to evaluate specific aspects of 
the project (Mathiassen et al., 1998).7 While this involvement provided in-depth understanding, we 
used three techniques to guard against bias: (1) triangulation within and between different data 
sources, (2) the use of a time-line to arrange data and build a coherent story, and (3) source critique 
and formulation of alternative explanations (Golden, 1997; Mason et al., 1997; Yin, 2003). We also 
employed these techniques to guard against biases inherent in collecting data retrospectively. 
 
Retrospective data collection and use of secondary data sources are frequent in escalation and de-
escalation case research (Lipshitz, 1995; Ross and Staw, 1986; 1993), due to the difficulty of 
following such projects as they unfold and the problem of gaining access to events that may reflect 
negatively on an organization and its members. In the case of VUE, we supplemented secondary 
data with retrospective interviews with select key actors. Thus, our data collection approach was 
similar to Ross and Staw’s (1993) study of the Shoreham nuclear power plant.  
 
We analyzed more than 800 pages of publicly available data from several categories: 
                                                     
6 We use the term exit champion rather than de-escalation champion, because it is already established and more 
succinct. “Exit” here means exit from a failing course of action, thus including project redirection (turnaround) as well 
as project termination (cancellation).  
7 This involvement does not qualify this study as action research (Baskerville, 1999; Davison et al., 2004) but rather 
qualifies as participant observation within the case study approach (Yin, 2003). 
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• External assessments of VUE carried out by experts or officials outside the project and its 
governance structure (e.g., Harder, 2000; Larsen et al., 1999; Mathiassen et al., 1998)—four 
reports. 
• Articles in professional magazines (e.g., Amnitzboell, 1999; Clausen, 1999; Djørup, 2000; 
Nielsen, 1999; Ørskov, 1999a, c)—18 articles. 
• Articles in newspapers (e.g., Pedersen and Klarskov, 1999; Ritzaus Bureau, 1999a, b)—48 
articles. 
• Documentation from universities, the Danish parliament and ministries (e.g., 
Aalborg University, 1999; Nathan, 1998)—22 documents. 
 
Following Eisenhardt’s (1989) advice to overlap data collection and analysis and to adopt flexible data 
collection methods, we identified key informants to help complete the case description. This led to six 
interviews with four key participants in the VUE project, using individualized semi-structured interview 
guides (see Appendix A for an example). The informants were chosen to triangulate other data 
sources and encompassed the following stakeholders: Customers/Users, VUE Project/VUE Center, 
and External Vendor (Figure 1). Specifically, we interviewed one manager who had worked with VUE 
at one large and two small universities, the managing director of the VUE Center, the project manager 
from the software contractor WM-data, and, the account manager from WM-data. 
3.2. Data Analysis 
The first step in analyzing data from VUE involved constructing a chronological case narrative. This 
was facilitated by constructing a timeline for the entire project (see Appendix B for a stylized version 
of this timeline). We then used the Montealegre and Keil (2000) model as an organizing template to 
develop a chronological summary of the VUE project’s de-escalation (Table 2).  
 
In the next step, we produced an inventory of actors and actions during the various de-escalation 
phases based on a careful reading of the case narrative together with continual revisiting of all data 
sources (Table 3). Actors and actions were corroborated by one of our authors based on his first-hand 
knowledge of the project. We then applied content analysis to the cells of Table 3 to examine each 
action and identify an underlying role implied by this action. To do so, we analyzed the impact of each 
action and determined if it implied a new role or represented an instance of a previously identified role.  
 
For example, we observed that Per Harder was ostensibly engaged to render an “objective” 
assessment of VUE, but that his report seemed to have facilitated de-escalation by reinforcing the 
utility of withdrawal (Staw and Ross, 1987) and by removing roadblocks to closing down VUE (Harder 
stated that state employees had not been criminally negligent; closing down VUE would not have to 
lead to legal action). This supported the line of action pursued by Minister Margrethe Vestager (who 
we separately identified as an exit champion). We hypothesized that this may be a pattern of action 
that could constitute a role, which we tentatively named “legitimizer.” When analyzing other actions 
(e.g., Per Harder’s involvement in earlier phases and the involvement by consulting firm Jacobsen & 
Associates), we detected a similar pattern whereby the reports by external parties were used to 
advance the de-escalation process. These actions did not seem to require creating a new role; rather, 
they strengthened the case for the legitimizer role. After the analysis of all cells in Table 3, we 
reassessed and reviewed the preliminary set of roles. For example, we compared the legitimizer role 
to other roles, such as exit champion and messenger, and found that there was no overlap in actors 
between the two roles and that their impact on de-escalation was distinctly different. Through this 
process we aimed to achieve consistency, parsimony, completeness and meaningfulness of the role 
set. This left us with a parsimonious set of roles (Table 4) that could be mapped to de-escalation 
phases (Table 5). 
 
Thereafter, we analyzed how identified roles interacted and exercised influence. This was done in an 
iterative fashion (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Paré, 2004; Yin, 2003). The 
mappings of roles to de-escalation phases (Table 5) guided our identification of key role interactions. 
Each time we identified a candidate pattern, we returned to the detailed case narrative to validate, 
adjust, or reject it. In conjunction, we also analyzed what resources or means each role drew upon  
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in order to influence others (Frost and Stahelski, 1988; Raven et al., 1998). We analyzed each 
identified interaction and coded it using an updated and expanded version of the French and Raven 
(1959) typology of bases of power (Raven et al., 1998). We also revisited the case narrative to look 
for actions and conditions that signaled influence without overt role interaction.8 
4. The VUE Project 
This section presents the history and context of VUE, highlighting the de-escalation process from 
antecedent condition9 through the phases of de-escalation to the project outcome. An overview of the 
history of VUE is available in Appendix B, and a chronological summary of the de-escalation of VUE 
is provided in Table 2. 
4.1. Antecedent Condition 
In 1989, Bertel Haarder, the Danish Minister of Education, was criticized for lack of control over the 
funding and productivity (student throughput and quality of education) of Danish universities. Danish 
universities are state institutions funded by the state of Denmark but operating with considerable 
autonomy. Haarder responded to the criticism by establishing a working group aimed at creating an IT 
system for all Danish universities. In addition to saving taxpayer money by streamlining university 
administration, the new system would provide a means for evaluating institutional performance, which 
ultimately could be linked to financial incentives. 
 
Early on, the project received criticism for being high risk with little chance of success. Nevertheless, 
in 1991 the Danish parliament’s Finance Committee appropriated six million EUR10 for the Ministry of 
Education to develop the VUE system. It was to be used by all Danish universities and consisted of 
three subsystems: (1) a general student information and grades subsystem, called STADS, (2) a 
financial and personnel management subsystem called ØSS, and (3) a central administrative sub-
system within the Ministry of Education (a basic version of which already existed). The system was 
expected to be up and running by 1994. Unbeknownst to the Finance Committee, Aarhus University, 
the second largest university in Denmark, decided to opt out of VUE at this early stage.11 A new 
organization called the VUE Center was created to oversee the development and to work as an 
intermediary between the universities and the external vendor. The VUE Center would also be 
responsible for operating and maintaining the implemented system. The core systems requirements 
were defined by the end of 1993, but with little involvement from users (Larsen et al., 1999): Only a 
few universities had a seat in the Specialist Steering Committee that provided input on requirements. 
Criticism of the project was not well received under Bertel Haarder’s leadership. In one instance, VUE 
development manager Bjarne Kohl was fired after voicing concerns about insufficient funding. The 
president of Copenhagen University, Ove Nathan, recalled another instance: “When I compared the 
VUE project to an over-dimensioned bridge project, Bertel lost control, stood up, and hammered the 
chair to the floor so that the crystal chandelier clinked dangerously” (Nathan, 1998, p. 235). 
 
In January 1993, Ole Vig Jensen replaced Haarder as minister of education. Jensen requested that 
the Ministry of Finance appropriate additional funds for VUE. At the same time, an internal feasibility 
study recommended that the ØSS subsystem should be based on an Oracle-based standard 
application package, rather than developed in-house. In response to this study, the parliament’s 
Finance Committee decided on additional funding to the project of 3.3 million EUR. 
 
From the end of 1993 to the beginning of 1995, two prototypes of the STADS subsystem were 
                                                     
8 For example, reward and coercive power can influence behavior at one time even when the reward or punishment 
is carried out at a later time. Thus, an actor may exert influence on the basis of such powers even when there is no 
reward or punishment within a certain timeframe. 
9 The antecedent condition was a high level of commitment to a previously chosen course of action that had failed to 
produce desired results, i.e., a condition of escalation. 
10 The appropriation was 45 million Danish Kroner. An exchange rate of 1:7.5 is used for Euro (EUR) to Danish 
Kroner throughout the paper. 
11 The main reasons behind Aarhus University’s decision to opt out of VUE were that its existing systems worked well 
and were not in need of replacement, and that its management was skeptical towards the VUE project. 
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developed and tested at Copenhagen University, several engineering colleges, and Aarhus Business 
School. Two major conclusions were reached from testing: (1) more functionality was needed, and (2) 
more funds were needed to complete the project. In May 1995 Minister Jensen requested an addi-
tional 5.1 million EUR. In response to this request, the Danish parliament’s Finance Committee hired 
consulting firm McKinsey & Co. to conduct an investigation. McKinsey & Co. found that the project 
was in clear danger of failing (Ørskov, 1999c). Shortly thereafter, in October 1995, the auditor general 
of Denmark published a highly critical report. The project was already 18 months behind schedule, 
and the estimated cost had nearly tripled to 17.3 million EUR.  
 
In Denmark, the general public and the media have extensive rights to access information from public 
institutions and there is a corresponding culture of openness to the public. Consequently, the auditor 
general’s report prompted considerable public attention and highly negative press. After the storm had 
dissipated, the VUE Center, incorporating all development activities, was made an independent entity 
under the Ministry of Education. Through this measure, future costs for VUE were removed from the 
ministry’s budget, although VUE still had to report to the ministry. Additional funding would have to 
come from the university institutions and, in turn, institutions would be allowed to withdraw from VUE. 
The possibility to opt out of VUE was stated in an official document that came to be known as the 
“freedom letter.” (Up to that point, VUE adoption had been mandatory.) A decision was also made by 
the ministries and the parliament’s Finance Committee that the ongoing operation of the VUE Center 
would eventually have to be funded by the participating institutions. Minister Jensen set the new 
deadline for VUE to August 1998. 
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The VUE center delivered a basic version of the STADS subsystem to the Danish Technical 
University in November 1996. In the following two years, a new university implemented STADS every 
three to five months, while the other VUE subsystems remained in development with repeatedly 
revised delivery dates. 
 
Figure 1 provides a categorized overview of the actors in the VUE project. It should be noted that the 
universities can be divided into larger universities (with more complex systems support requirements 
and with financial resources to consider alternatives to VUE) and smaller universities and technical 
colleges (with limited options). During the project’s escalation, the Finance Committee acted as 
project sponsor, and the Minister of Education Bertel Haarder was the initial project champion. As we 
move to the de-escalation phase of the project, many of the same actors are prominent, but they step 
into new roles. 
4.2. Phase 1: Problem Recognition 
Recognizing negative feedback 
By 1998, the seriousness of problems in VUE was finally recognized. The two remaining large 
universities, Copenhagen University and Copenhagen Business School, decided that they were not 
going to adopt VUE. As Copenhagen University Director Else Sommer explained, “At some point it 
has taken too long before things improve and you lose confidence that something useful will emerge” 
(Ritzaus Bureau, 1999b). Since Aarhus University had already stepped out of VUE, the system would 
now, if and when completed, only process student data for about 50 percent of Danish students. 
Several smaller universities and engineering colleges, however, were already using the system, and 
even though the functionality was less than originally hoped for, they depended on it. Around this time, 
the vendor, WM-data, announced additional delays in deliverables (Mathiassen et al., 1998). 
 
There were several reasons for the largest universities to pull out of the project. These universities 
had needs that were partly different from the smaller universities and had already invested in 
developing customized solutions. Their enthusiasm for accepting a standard “one size fits all” system 
was never particularly high. Thus, they followed a “wait and see” approach, and as problems became 
more pronounced it became opportune for them to withdraw.  
Responding to external pressure 
The pressure on VUE continued with numerous articles in Danish newspapers during the spring of 
1999 and reached an explosive point when the auditor general’s report was released. The critique 
was four-fold: (1) the project had not led to the expected improvements, and economic advantages 
that had been prime reasons for the project had not materialized, (2) development had cost three 
times more and taken five years longer than estimated, (3) fewer than half of the estimated number of 
institutions were using the system, and (4) the promised functionality was not delivered (Harder, 
2000; Larsen et al., 1999). The report was very critical of the Ministry of Education, accusing it of 
hiding facts from the parliament’s Finance Committee. Partly because of this criticism, the formal 
responsibility for VUE was transferred from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Research. Jan 
Trøjborg, the new Minister of Research, became formally responsible for the project. 
4.3. Phase 2: Re-examination of Prior Course of Action 
Clarifying magnitude of problem 
After becoming responsible for VUE, Jan Trøjborg started to clarify the magnitude of the problems 
involved. He found that the Technical University and the engineering colleges were using STADS and 
were dependent on it, and that it would create major problems if VUE was withdrawn since their 
legacy systems were no longer usable. Furthermore, three smaller universities, Aalborg University, 
Roskilde University, and Southern Denmark University, indicated that they were not yet using STADS, 
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Redefining the Problem 
The Ministry of Research realized that the project had become a huge financial burden and the 
present course of action could not be sustained. At the beginning of 1999, Jan Trøjborg implemented 
a decision that had been reached earlier and instructed the participating institutions to pay for 
development work on VUE. In essence, this meant that the problem was redefined from “How can the 
government provide university institutions with an integrated information system?” to “How can the 
government avoid the mounting costs of the project?” and subsequently to “How can the 
responsibility for development costs be shifted from government to universities?” 
4.4. Phase 3: Search for Alternative Course of Action  
Obtaining independent evidence of problems 
In addition to the report from the auditor general (Larsen et al., 1999), Minister of Education 
Margrethe Vestager in early 1999 requested an independent report from lawyer Per Harder that 
would later prove instrumental in managing impressions and framing the withdrawal from VUE. 
Identifying an alternative course of action 
The total cost of VUE, including participating institutions’ costs of over 19 million EUR, had now grown 
to 47.7 million EUR (Larsen et al., 1999). Thus, the Minister of Research Jan Trøjborg had clear 
evidence of the burden VUE had become. 
 
Two strategies were discussed (Aalborg University, 1999): (1) selling the VUE Center to a private 
company or (2) letting the university institutions take over VUE. The leader of the VUE Center was 
one of the originators of the idea to sell it. This influenced the Ministry of Education to decide that the 
VUE Center should be sold, and the Parliament’s Finance Committee agreed to this in May 1999. In 
response, the participating universities attempted to form a procurement group to purchase services 
from the VUE Center for the STADS subsystem and the financial and personnel management 
subsystem ØSS.  
4.5. Phase 4: Implement an Exit Strategy 
Appealing to stakeholders 
In July 1999, it was publicly announced that the VUE Center was for sale. In August 1999, three 
companies showed an interest and negotiations began. The involved university institutions were told 
that VUE was going to be sold, and they were not happy. Jørgen Holm Nielsen, responsible for VUE 
at the engineering colleges’ support center, commented on the announced sale, “We are now in the 
implementation phase. For us, it is vital to maintain the systems and add new functionality … now we 
risk losing our investments” (Ørskov, 1999a). 
 
In September 1999, the Ministry of Research called off the selling of VUE. The newly appointed 
Minister of Research, Birthe Weiss, explained that it was not an attractive buy, “Potential buyers were 
only guaranteed to service and supply the universities for one year” (Ritzaus Bureau, 1999a). News 
reports also stated that “the involved institutions had only a modest interest in entering into an 
obligation to fund the VUE Center” (Ritzaus Bureau, 1999a). In addition, a department head within the 
Ministry of Research, Thorkild Meedom, explained, “We could not get sufficient guarantees that the 
employees would be allowed to continue working” (Nielsen, 1999). By calling off the sale, the minister 
reduced the risk that the universities dependent on VUE would get a supplier without a long term 
commitment and appeased VUE Center employees because their jobs would no longer be in jeopardy. 
Managing Impressions 
The independent investigator, Per Harder, completed his report in April 2000 (Harder, 2000). The 
report was immediately used to manage impressions as part of the public debate. Specifically, the 
Minister of Education Margrethe Vestager used the report to promote two views: (1) the ministries 
were doing the right thing in downsizing VUE and shifting responsibility to the universities and (2) the 
problems plaguing VUE were not the result of incompetence or gross negligence on the part of 
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ministry employees. 
 
On the basis of Per Harder’s report, Vestager concluded that there would be no cases filed against 
civil servants. In Denmark, unless a civil servant is shown to have violated the law, he or she cannot 
be fired. In the case of VUE, no significant wrongdoing was found. In effect, impressions were 
managed by stating that there was no gross negligence, at least not enough to trigger lawsuits and 
the dismissal of senior managers. Rather, the major cause of the problems was that requirements 
had not been sufficiently defined by the universities. In interaction between the exit champions and 
the media, the original goals and requirements of VUE were characterized as “utopist,” and this 
circumstance was ascribed to the actions and central role of former minister Bertel Haarder in the 
early period of the VUE project (Ørskov, 1999b). 
4.6. Outcome 
In early 2000, the VUE Center was closed, and the participating universities initiated new forms of 
collaboration to ensure continued operation and maintenance of the system by external vendors. 
Closing the VUE Center effectively de-institutionalized the project, reducing the responsibility of the 
ministry, and aligning the organizational and economic set-up of the project with the actual 
commitments from Danish universities to use and further develop a scaled-back system. The VUE 
project had undergone de-escalation. 
 
In 2003, the salvaged parts of the VUE system were alive and well. The involved universities were still 
collaborating on purchasing maintenance and operations services from external vendors.. One key 
informant expressed that the STADS part of VUE had never worked better. Collaborations between 
universities were also in place for financial services and personnel services (ØSS), and the original 
system for central administration had been retained with sufficient functionality. By 2007, STADS was 
being used at all Danish universities except one. VUE, however, “…is simply not used as a concept 
anymore. It disappeared quickly from the dictionary when the VUE Center was closed…” (WM-data 
executive). 
5. Analysis and Discussion 
In this section, we first identify and discuss roles that were present in the VUE de-escalation. 
Subsequently, we analyze and discuss key role interactions that impacted how de-escalation played 
out. 
5.1. Role Identification 
The basis for the role analysis was the inventory of actors and actions during the de-escalation 
process of the VUE project (Table 3). We used content analysis to identify the underlying roles 
associated with these actions. As an illustration, when going through the 26 populated cells in Table 3, 
we found several actions that created road blocks for de-escalation. For example, the small 
universities and engineering colleges repeatedly stressed their dependence on VUE. We concluded 
that these actions blocked de-escalation by placing demands on the exit champion and increasing the 
political cost of complete project abandonment. Consequently, this pattern of actions placed the small 
universities and engineering colleges in the role of exit blocker. In the next analysis step (reported in 
the following section), we analyzed role interactions. Here, we found that the exit champion worked to 
accommodate demands from exit blockers (appeal to stakeholders). Therefore, we formulated a 
proposition to capture this key role interaction. We followed the same process for all cells and actions 
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The analysis resulted in identification of seven distinct roles involved in de-escalation: messenger, 
exit sponsor, exit champion, exit catalyst, exit blocker, legitimizer, and scapegoat. Each of these roles 
is discussed below and relevant literature is enfolded in the discussion where applicable. Table 4 
provides a summary of the key roles in de-escalation. 
 
Table 4. Key Roles in De-escalation Processes 
ROLE DESCRIPTION OF ROLE 
Messenger 
(Auditor General, Vendor WM-data) 
Messengers communicate a problem description 
concerning the escalating project to appropriate 
recipients in a way that provides evidence that the 
current course of action is not a viable strategy for 
the project, and provides impetus for action to the 
message recipients. 
Exit Sponsor  
(Parliament’s Finance Committee) 
Exit sponsors provide the formal authority and the 
continued pressure that empower and push exit 
champions to follow through with de-escalation in 
spite of encountered obstacles. 
Exit Champion 
(Ministers of education and research) 
Exit champions actively pursue de-escalation of a 
faltering project and manage the de-escalation 
process, including recognizing and drawing attention 
to the problem, investigating the problem and 
alternative courses of action, and implementing an 
exit strategy. 
Exit Catalyst 
(Large Universities, General Public and 
Media) 
Exit catalysts help focus attention on, and give 
significance to, events that indicate escalation. 
Through their observation, actions and reactions, 
exit catalysts contribute to increased emphasis on 
the problems and make the consequences of 
maintaining the existing course of action more 
visible, thus providing or strengthening the impetus 
for the exit champion to pursue de-escalation. 
Exit Blocker  
(VUE Center, Colleges and Small 
Universities) 
Exit blockers hinder or slow down the de-escalation 
effort by insisting on the viability or necessity of 
project continuation and by placing restrictions and 
conditions on project abandonment. 
Legitimizer  
(Harder, Jacobsen & Associates) 
Legitimizers provide trustworthy external 
observations, assessments and advice on a failing 
course of action in a manner that exposes escalation 
and supplies arguments for de-escalation. 
Scapegoat  
(Former Minister of Education Bertel 
Haarder) 
Scapegoats shoulder blame for a failing or failed 
effort, through actions of their own or unwittingly 
through actions by others, in a way that lowers to 
threshold for other actors to pursue de-escalation. 
Messenger 
According to Keil and Robey (1999), the messenger brings bad news about a project to someone with 
authority to act. The absence of a messenger is closely related to non-reporting of bad news on 
organizational undertakings, sometimes labeled as a “mum effect” (Smith et al., 2001) or 
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In the VUE case, the messenger that successfully initiated the de-escalation process was the auditor 
general, Ivar Hansen, who delivered a highly critical and public report in 1999. Hansen’s report was 
further supported by the vendor WM-data’s announcement of delays in deliverables during late 1998 
and early 1999. While WM-data did not aim to initiate intense scrutiny of the project, but rather to 
manage expectations, it still unwittingly played the role of messenger in bringing bad news that was 
instrumental to de-escalation. Some messengers (such as Hansen) thus resembled whistle-blowers 
(Keil and Robey, 2001; Near and Miceli, 1985), while others were less deliberate in their actions (such 
as WM-data). 
 
Although several critical reports from different messengers were provided earlier, de-escalation was 
not triggered until 1999. This suggests that perhaps the most critical and difficult task for the 
messenger is to find interested message receivers (Keil and Robey, 1999). This suggests that several 
roles may be necessary to bring about de-escalation. Without a potential exit sponsor and exit 
champion, messengers are likely to be ineffective, such as in the Challenger case (Vaughan, 1996). 
Similarly, the VUE project was not halted in 1995: In spite of negative information on project viability, 
nobody enacted the exit sponsor or exit champion roles at that time. 
Exit Sponsor 
The Danish parliament’s Finance Committee acted as exit sponsor by expressing persistent interest 
in the problems plaguing VUE, by providing support (cf. Heng et al., 2003a), and by exercising 
pressure on the ministers (exit champions) throughout the de-escalation process. The existence of an 
exit sponsor, separate and distinct from the exit champion, is consistent with the roles of project spon-
sor and project champion in the IS implementation literature (Lederer and Nath, 1991; Rockart and 
De Long, 1988). 
 
Exit sponsors provide the formal authority and the continued pressure that empower and push exit 
champions to follow through with de-escalation in spite of encountered obstacles. As Sauer (1993) 
points out, project success ultimately hinges on securing and maintaining funding. Withdrawing 
funding or threatening to withdraw funding are powerful ways for exit sponsors to spur de-escalation.  
Exit Champion 
The role of exit champion was carried out jointly by the Ministries of Education and Research, and it 
was enacted under influence of messengers and exit sponsor. The activities included recognizing and 
drawing attention to the problem, investigating the problem and alternative courses of action, and 
implementing an exit strategy. In the VUE case, the ministers of education and research were 
instrumental in managing the de-escalation and the exit of the Danish government from VUE. 
 
According to Royer (2003), de-escalation is unlikely to take place in the absence of an exit champion. 
Indeed, VUE was questioned early on, but the education minister at that time was highly committed 
and highly influential, successfully exercising the role of project champion. VUE was in serious trouble 
as early as 1995, but at that time, there was no exit champion for de-escalation of the project. The 
presence of a strong project champion and no exit champion hindered the initiation of de-escalation. 
When de-escalation did occur, the role of exit champion became evident throughout the process. The 
involved ministers questioned the project and changed its course from their institutional vantage point 
outside the project. 
 
In accordance with earlier findings (Keil, 1995; Keil and Robey, 1999), external shocks and the 
discontinuities created by changes of key actors and their responsibilities (ministers and ministry 
responsibilities) were influential factors in making the ministers for education and research take on 
the role of exit champion. These changes both removed the original project champion (Education 
Minister Bertel Haarder) and led to the casting of the exit champion role, creating a situation con-
ducive to de-escalation. Similarly, Royer (2003) found that exit champions were likely to be “new” to 
the situation rather than enmeshed in the project since its early stages.  
 
In contrast, Pan and colleagues (Pan et al., 2006a; Pan et al., 2004) found that the project champion 
in their study of an e-procurement project in a UK municipal borough was instrumental in bringing 
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about de-escalation. They identified as project champion the “E-envoy,” a local government official 
overseeing e-government initiatives. Unlike project champions studied by Royer (2002; 2003), the E-
envoy did not actively participate in project governance until someone blew the whistle (i.e., a 
messenger); the E-envoy then stepped in to effectuate de-escalation. Thus, the actions of the E-
envoy are consistent with the exit champion role. 
 
Pan et al. (2004) also found the continued commitment of the project champion to be important for 
the de-escalation effort (continued commitment here refers to the de-escalation effort—not continued 
commitment to the escalating course of action). This is consistent with observations of exit champions 
by Royer (2003) as well as the results of this study. We suggest that the exit champion concept more 
clearly depicts the role played by the E-envoy in de-escalation of the e-procurement project.12 The 
exit champion concept can, thus, reconcile the apparent discrepancies between the findings by Pan 
and colleagues and Royer and bring their findings in alignment with existing literature (Keil, 1995; 
Staw and Ross, 1987). Moreover, the exit champion concept helps avoid confusion between 
continued commitment to de-escalation and escalation as continued commitment to a failing course 
of action (Brockner, 1992). 
Exit Catalyst 
Whereas messengers brought bad news to exit sponsors and exit champions, a different group of 
actors, the three large universities, had already “voted with their feet” by announcing that they would 
not adopt VUE. By doing so, they assumed the role of exit catalyst, playing an instrumental part in 
making the exit sponsor react to the negative news from the messenger. In the IS and organizational 
change literatures, the word catalyst is often used to denote a circumstance or actor that focuses 
other actors’ attention on a change process (Bartkus, 1997; Rankin and Golden, 2002; Raschke and 
Smith-David, 2005).  
 
The role of the exit catalyst is indirect: the catalyst focuses other actors’ attention and action on 
change rather than being a central actor in that change. The actions of the exit catalyst(s) kept 
emphasizing the problems and made the consequences of maintaining the existing course of action 
visible, thus providing or strengthening the impetus for the exit champion to act. This role was initially 
identified in the first phase of the de-escalation process, but it can also reappear over time. In the 
VUE case, we see that the general public and media later contributed to the sustained pressure on 
exit champions to pursue de-escalation and in this way also played a catalytic role. Since our role 
analysis focuses on impact, not intent, a catalyst need not act purposefully in pursuit of de-escalation. 
Exit Blocker 
The smaller universities and the technical colleges insisted on the importance of VUE for their 
administrative processes and stressed their dependence on the continued development and 
operation of the system. Thus, they performed the role of exit blockers. The exit blockers were most 
visible in the two last phases, although in the first de-escalation phase, the VUE Center attempted to 
block de-escalation by hiring external consultants to analyze deliveries from WM-data. Had this tactic 
worked, it could have been used to deflect criticism from VUE and argue for the continued viability of 
the project through incremental adaptation of the current course of action (Mähring and Keil, 2008). 
Managing exit blockers became part of the exit champions’ task portfolio, and was done, for example, 
by first initiating the selling of VUE, then attempting to form a procurement group of the universities, 
and finally reforming the procurement group into a maintenance consortium for VUE. These actions 
can all be seen as attempts to co-opt exit blockers, demonstrating the importance of exit champions 
addressing the needs of exit blockers. 
 
Exit blockers act to hinder the de-escalation effort by insisting on the viability or necessity of project 
continuation and by placing restrictions and conditions on project abandonment. There is empirical 
                                                     
12 It should be noted that the E-envoy’s commitment was never to the e-procurement effort as an independent 
endeavor, but to the overall e-government effort and that de-escalation only concerned partial abandonment of a 
subproject to the overall effort. We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing out the nature and scope of 
the de-escalation effort in this case. 
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support for this role in the case of the Shoreham nuclear plant (Ross and Staw, 1993), where the 
closing of the plant by its owner LILCO was counteracted by exit blockers in the form of the US 
federal government (acting through the Departments of Energy and Justice) and an influential interest 
group. This case was brought to the U.S. Supreme Court as part of the exit blocking effort and 
several lawsuits were filed against LILCO. The existence of exit blockers is also supported by the 
escalation framework developed by Staw and Ross (1987), in which political support and 
institutionalization are both seen as factors promoting or sustaining escalation. 
Legitimizer 
Another de-escalation role frequently present in the VUE case was that of legitimizer. This role was 
played by external consultants and other examiners. These included the lawyer Per Harder (Harder, 
2000), and the consulting firm Jacobsen & Associates (Mathiassen et al., 1998). These actors 
provided external perspectives on the project in several de-escalation phases. We have chosen 
“legitimizer” rather than “investigator” because the emphasis is primarily on providing additional argu-
ments for de-escalation. Legitimizing assessments and reports are normally initiated and funded by 
someone with a specific purpose. Their official purpose is seldom to actively facilitate the de-
escalation process. They do, however, provide information and statements that are used to bolster an 
argument for de-escalation or for a specific exit strategy. 
 
The evidence from the VUE case suggests that the external position of legitimizers is important and is 
part of their attractiveness for exit champions and exit catalysts. The apparent non-affiliation provides 
an impression of objectivity and their “statements of facts,” therefore, have more credibility than if 
expressed by actors with vested interests in the project, pronounced interest in its abandonment, or 
actual or imagined political agendas involving other actors. Legitimizers can also be important in 
maneuvering to distribute or avoid blame (Heng et al., 2003a). 
 
We found legitimizers to be present in three out of four de-escalation phases. In later phases they 
were often used by exit champions to help de-escalation by legitimizing a new course of action, 
managing impressions, or appealing to stakeholders. 
Scapegoat 
While not previously identified as a role in de-escalation, the role of scapegoat is well known in 
organizational life (Boeker, 1992; Bonazzi, 1983), and one IS study found that the existence of a 
possible scapegoat may facilitate bad news reporting in troubled software projects (Keil et al., 2004; 
Keil et al., 2007). Bertel Haarder, former Minister of Education, was directly and indirectly assigned a 
substantial part of the blame for the VUE failure: Several of the consultancy reports pointed to the 
botched start of the project and the elevated ambition level and risks of the original project charter; 
these findings were repeated in public statements by the ministers of education and research as VUE 
was about to be scrapped; and the media attributed the failure to the “utopist vision” of Bertel Haarder. 
His role as scapegoat was cemented in the last de-escalation phase. It should be noted that this 
scapegoating did not necessarily constitute a fair or balanced distribution of blame.  
 
Bonazzi (1983) distinguished between expressive and instrumental scapegoating. While expressive 
scapegoating happens as a group looks for ways to release emotional tension, instrumental 
scapegoating takes place to uphold the legitimacy and existence of social structures (societal 
institutions, organizational power structures) threatened by a negative event. Instrumental 
scapegoating takes place when powerful actors assign or shift blame to less powerful actors in order 
to put distance between themselves and negative events or circumstances (Boeker 1992; Bonazzi 
1983). Perhaps the perennial existence of scapegoats is a sign of a universal human need to reduce 
uncertainty and maintain legitimacy by shifting blame.13 
 
Royer (2003) suggested that project champions and exit champions are normally distinct roles,  
                                                     
13 The scapegoat term has its origin in the old testament of the Bible, where a ritual is described in which a goat was 
sacrificed on behalf of the sins of the people. We thank the senior editor for the suggestion to explicate the functions 
and meanings of the scapegoat. 
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partly in conflict. As a consequence, forceful project champions of ultimately unsuccessful projects are 
likely candidates for becoming scapegoats (such as in the VUE case). Transitions from the exit 
champion role to the scapegoat role would likely be rare, but have been observed (Drummond, 1996). 
While scapegoating is often seen as detrimental, even pathological, organizational behavior (Ashforth 
and Lee, 1990), the existence of a scapegoat can facilitate de-escalation of runaway projects, albeit 
at a price for the actor taking on or being forced into the scapegoat role. In effect, the scapegoat 
shoulders blame, making other actors more prone to pursue de-escalation (Heng et al., 2003a). 
5.2. Role Interaction 
Next we analyzed how roles interacted during the phases of de-escalation. Table 5 shows that while 
some roles were present throughout the process, other roles were important only in some of the 
phases.  
 
Since role interaction is tightly linked to interpersonal influence, and since it has been suggested that 
interpersonal power impacts de-escalation (Drummond, 1995), we also addressed what resources or 
means each role drew upon in order to influence others (Frost and Stahelski, 1988; Raven et al., 
1998).14 To do so, we used an updated version of the seminal French and Raven (1959) framework, 
identifying six bases of power in interpersonal influence (Raven et al., 1998): reward, coercive, expert, 
informational, legitimate and referent power (Table 6). We conducted the analysis of power bases by 
studying the actions observed for each role and coding these based on the type of influence they 
encompassed. Finally, we formulated propositions on roles and role interactions based on the VUE 
case, and theorized on their importance for de-escalation. 
 
Table 6. Bases of Power (Based on Raven et al., 1998) 




The power to bestow rewards on the target in return for compliance. A 





The power to force compliance by threat of punishment. This could also be 
either impersonal or through changes in personal/emotional relationship 
aspects. 
Expert Power The power to attain compliance on the basis of the agent’s expertise. 
Informational 
Power 







The right to prescribe behavior through formal position or to demand 
behavior by reference to other’s obligation. Sub-categories are position 
(authority), reciprocity (obligation to respond in kind after a previous action 
by the other part), equity (obligation to compensate for hard work or 
sufferance), and dependence (obligation to take responsibility for someone 
in need of assistance). 
Referent Power The power to induce behavior by referring to or relying on the target’s 
identification with the influencing agent. 
 
The critical movement from escalation to de-escalation in the VUE project manifested itself as a 
tipping point (Gladwell, 2000), which was reached when a messenger managed to engage an exit 
sponsor in problem recognition (Montealegre and Keil, 2000). By communicating bad news about a 
project, messengers exercise informational power and expert power (Raven et al., 1998). However, 
for the messenger’s actions to be effective, there must be actors willing to enact the role of exit 
                                                     
14 We thank the senior editor and two anonymous reviewers for pointing us to the value of including an analysis of 
power related to the roles. 
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sponsor, and these actors must have sufficient authority (legitimate position power, Raven et al., 
1998) and no serious role conflicts related to the escalating project (Grover, 1993; Keil, 1995; Royer, 
2003). In the VUE project, the Danish Finance Committee was receptive to bad news, it was in a 
position of strong authority, and it occupied no leading role in the project. The task of the Finance 
Committee was to monitor the actions of the ministries; for the committee VUE was one project 
among others. Thus,  
Proposition 1: Initiation of the problem recognition phase of de-escalation is more 
likely when a messenger effectively communicates with an actor willing and able to 
take on the exit sponsor role.  
 
Royer’s (2002; 2003) study indicated that an exit champion may also be instrumental in the initiation 
of de-escalation. Like exit sponsors, exit champions should, in order to be committed to de-escalation, 
have no serious role conflict related to the escalating project (Keil, 1995; Royer, 2003; Staw and Ross, 
1987). In the VUE case, it was the active commitment and engagement of exit champions that made 
the de-escalation process take off. The exit champions were instrumental in recognizing and drawing 
attention to the problem, investigating the problem and alternative courses of action, and 
subsequently implementing an exit strategy. In so doing, they interacted with other key actors making 
use of different bases of power (Raven et al., 1998), including legitimate power (decisions and actions 
that relied on their ministerial positions), coercion (threat of withdrawing funding), and informational 
power (informing actors about decisions and requests by the exit sponsor as well as about emerging 
problems). Since the exit champions were ministers with significant influence over government policy 
concerning higher education institutions, they had reward and coercive power over these institutions 
because of their influence over future resource and policy decisions affecting them (Raven et al., 
1998).  
 
In the VUE case the ministers of education and research came to occupy the role of exit champion as 
a result of considerable pressure from the exit sponsor (legitimate position, reward, and coercion 
power, Raven et al., 1998). The exit sponsor (the Finance Committee) played a significant role in the 
de-escalation process because it controlled the purse strings, and it could pressure as well as support 
the exit champion. The exit champions subsequently played critical roles by taking leadership of the 
de-escalation effort. Thus, 
Proposition 2: The problem recognition phase of de-escalation is more likely to 
proceed without interruption when both exit champion and exit sponsor roles have 
been instantiated. 
 
However, the exit sponsor and the exit champions were not moving the de-escalation forward on their 
own. In VUE, we found that exit catalysts and legitimizers played instrumental roles in encouraging 
re-examination of the prior course of action (Montealegre and Keil, 2000). The exit catalysts helped 
focus the attention of the exit sponsor and exit champions on the non-viability of the project 
(informational power). The legitimizers provided the exit champions and exit sponsors with political 
cover, facilitating the search for alternative courses of action based on insights from well-respected 
neutral parties outside the organization (expert and informational power, Raven et al., 1998). Put 
differently, exit catalysts draw attention to the burning platform, while legitimizers help map out the 
escape route. The exit catalyst and legitimizer roles were enacted by several actors (see Table 3 and 
Table 4). Thus,  
Proposition 3a: The de-escalation process is more likely to advance to re-
examination of prior course of action when the voices of the exit champion and exit 
sponsor are reinforced through the visible actions of exit catalysts. 
Proposition 3b: The de-escalation process is more likely to advance to search for 
alternative courses of action when the exit champion and exit sponsor are able to 
enlist legitimizers to actively support de-escalation activities. 
 
We also found that exit blockers existed throughout the escalation phases of the VUE project. 
However, these exit blockers were in relatively weak positions and dependent on, or controlled by, the 
exit champions. Still, exit blockers used the power they had, by referring to their dependence on the 
STADS part of VUE and by demanding to be properly treated because of what they had sacrificed for 
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the project (legitimate equity and legitimate dependence power, Raven et al., 1998). While exit 
blockers posed no significant threat to the de-escalation process as a whole, their actions probably 
influenced de-escalation so that the final solution included retaining the STADS system. 
 
Exit blockers might draw upon additional bases of power and exercise more power in other cases. As 
a result, it might be the relative balance of power between exit blockers and exit champions and 
sponsors that determines whether a project is successfully transitioned from escalation to de-
escalation (Drummond, 1995). In VUE, the successful transition to implementation of an exit strategy 
was facilitated because the original project sponsors and champions were no longer around to push 
for continuation as exit blockers (Royer, 2003). Also, the exit champion actively addressed the 
concerns of the small universities and technical colleges, thus minimizing any threat they posed as 
exit blockers. Thus, 
Proposition 4a: The de-escalation process is more likely to move forward toward 
active implementation of an exit strategy if the original project sponsors and 
champions do not engage as exit blockers. 
Proposition 4b: The de-escalation process is more likely to move forward toward 
actively implementing an exit strategy if the exit champion addresses the concerns of 
exit blockers. 
 
Our analysis also suggests that the successful completion of the de-escalation effort was facilitated 
by having an actor occupy the role of scapegoat. In the VUE case, the scapegoat role was forced 
upon former minister Bertel Haarder in an emergent fashion through several consultant reports and 
eventually through the media’s attribution of the failure of VUE to his “utopist vision.”  
 
To the extent that any power is exercised by the scapegoat, it can perhaps be called “reverse referent 
power”—a power related to distancing oneself from what the scapegoat stands for by placing an actor 
in the scapegoat role (Bonazzi, 1983; Eagle and Newton, 1981). Thus, 
Proposition 5: The completion of the de-escalation process is facilitated by one or 
more actors being placed in the role of scapegoat.  
 
Table 7. Bases of Power Employed by Roles in the VUE Project 
ROLE BASES OF POWER TYPICALLY EXERCISED 
BY ACTOR 
Messenger 
(Auditor General, Vendor WM-data) 
Informational Power 
Expert Power 
Exit Sponsor  
(Parliament’s Finance Committee) 
Legitimate Power (position) 
Coercive Power (punishment) 
Exit Champion 
(Ministers of education and research) 





(Large Universities, General Public and Media) Informational Power 
Exit Blocker  
(VUE Center, Colleges and Small Universities) Legitimate Power (equity, dependence) 
Legitimizer  
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In sum, our analysis indicates that de-escalation is not only facilitated by enactment of certain roles 
but also by certain role interactions that help move the process along. Furthermore, actors favoring 
de-escalation were, in the VUE case, able to rely on bases of power that together tipped the scale in 
favor of de-escalation. Table 7 provides a summary of bases of power utilized by actors enacting 
different roles in the VUE de-escalation. 
6. Conclusions and Implications 
Prior to discussing the conclusions and implications of our study, it is appropriate to touch on its 
limitations. The outcomes from case-based research are not usually statistical generalizations but 
analytical generalizations (Yin, 2003). According to Lee and Baskerville (2003), theory-informed “rich 
insight” from single-case analysis constitutes a valid and adequate form of generalized knowledge. 
Since our analysis has drawn upon a rich case as well as on theoretical contributions from earlier 
studies, there is a basis for expecting that the observed roles and interactions will occur in other 
cases, although not necessarily in exactly the same way. VUE was a large, multi-year project 
involving many different public sector organizational entities. In other cases, the number of roles 
involved may depend on circumstances such as project size and scope; some IT projects may exhibit 
considerably more uncertainty and complexity than others (Iivari, 1990); and infrastructure projects 
and standard ERP implementations may experience less variation in results than traditional appli-
cation development projects. Thus, our findings have to be assessed and used with some caution 
depending on context and conditions. Another limitation of our study, inherent in many escalation and 
de-escalation studies, is that most data were collected retrospectively. We addressed the resulting 
risk for bias in our data through first-hand observations by one of the authors and triangulation among 
different data sources. 
6.1. Contributions 
Our goal was to investigate key roles and role interactions during IT project de-escalation. Based on 
data from the VUE project, we identified seven key roles involved in de-escalation: messenger, exit 
sponsor, exit champion, exit catalyst, exit blocker, legitimizer, and scapegoat. Five of these roles had 
not been previously identified. We also analyzed role interaction patterns and interpersonal influence 
related to roles and forwarded five propositions on how to advance de-escalation. Together, the 
findings help fill an important gap in our understanding of how actors make de-escalation happen in 
runaway IT projects. 
 
Our results also resolved what appeared to be a contradiction between findings by Pan and 
colleagues (Pan et al., 2006a; Pan et al., 2004) and prior studies on escalation and de-escalation 
(Keil, 1995; Royer, 2003; Staw and Ross, 1987) concerning the role of the project champion in de-
escalation. Although not a purpose of the paper, we also found that the sequence of events in the 
VUE project was consistent with the Montealegre and Keil (2000) de-escalation process model. 
 
A key insight from the research is that the existence and enactment of several roles, as well as 
specific role interactions facilitate de-escalation. Therefore, exit champions are not “lone rangers”; 
they are members of a complex and dynamic set of roles that bring about de-escalation through 
interactions over time in a particular social context. This finding contrasts with Royer’s (2003) 
depiction of exit champions as the sole architects and executors of de-escalation.  
 
Specifically, we found that problem recognition is facilitated by messengers communicating effectively 
to would be exit sponsors. Exit sponsors, in turn, can engage exit champions to drive the process 
forward. Exit catalysts and legitimizers were instrumental in facilitating re-examination of the previous 
course of action and searching for alternative courses of action. While these interactions helped 
initiate the process and facilitated continued de-escalation efforts, exit sponsors and scapegoats also 
played important roles. Exit blockers expressed needs that could potentially hinder the de-escalation 
process, and the exit champion addressed the interests of the exit blockers so as to allow de-
escalation to proceed. Project sponsors and project champions were not found to enact any de-
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We do not suggest that all seven roles necessarily occur in all de-escalation situations, or that the five 
propositions cover all important interactions in successful de-escalation efforts. However, the 
proposed roles shed light on the complex and highly uncertain nature of IT-project de-escalation and 
the proposed role interactions that facilitate progression through the phases of de-escalation 
(Montealegre and Keil, 2000). Consequently, it is neither enough to know the script, i.e., the phases 
and actions of de-escalation, as expressed in the Montealegre and Keil model, nor enough to have an 
exit champion, as suggested by Royer (2002, 2003). To bring about de-escalation, several actors 
need to assume and enact specific roles and interaction patterns. 
6.2. Implications 
We believe that the role perspective is highly useful for understanding de-escalation processes and 
explaining why they unfold in certain ways. For future research, we suggest empirical investigation 
into different settings and circumstances (e.g., project size, number of involved parties, organizational 
contexts, loci of reasons behind de-escalation) as a means for validating and further developing our 
contributions. Our study also raises the question of whether roles should be included in other process 
theories within IS. For example, process aspects of escalation have been sparsely studied, and a role 
perspective might prove valuable in advancing that area of research.  
 
Another interesting aspect concerns the overlapping role combinations that can co-exist in 
organizations. Such a “multiplex role system” (Valcour, 2002)—for example, between runaway 
projects and their corresponding de-escalation efforts—would add complexity to the study of de-
escalation. Indeed, the embedded nature of intra-organizational IT projects strongly suggests that 
multiplex roles are likely to exist and influence project execution during de-escalation. Such studies 
could shed further light on various types of role conflicts (Grover, 1993) that create barriers to 
initiating and carrying out de-escalation of runaway IT projects. Future studies could also further 
expand how de-escalation processes are impacted by socio-political issues such as power, politics, 
and responsibility (Backhouse and Dhillon, 1996). In so doing, dynamic analyses of how roles gain 
and loose influence and how shifts in the balance of power impact the transition from escalation to de-
escalation would be particularly interesting. Yet another interesting research opportunity would be to 
study de-escalation and its involved actors using actor-network theory, as has been done for 
escalation (Mähring et al., 2004). 
 
Our findings have practical implications for intervention into runaway projects to facilitate de-
escalation. Actors considering reporting bad news about a runaway project (thus enacting a 
messenger role) are more likely to be successful if they identify actors who are likely to be receptive 
to hearing bad news and to act upon it, playing the role of exit sponsor. Potential messengers may 
also improve their chances by building alliances with actors that can serve as exit catalysts and 
legitimizers, and by couching their message in a form that includes a rationale for de-escalation and a 
proposed way to initiate de-escalation. Our study also strongly suggests that in the absence of a 
would-be exit sponsor with sufficient means of influence and no conflicting project roles, a messenger 
is unlikely to be effective.  
 
For actors enacting the exit sponsor role, it is important to identify and engage an exit champion to 
drive the process and to continue exerting pressure and provide support for the exit champion’s effort. 
The actor functioning as exit champion is advised to identify potential exit blockers early and consider 
to what extent it is feasible, desirable, and necessary to address their needs and concerns (Brunsson, 
1985; Ross and Staw, 1993). If exit blockers’ concerns cannot be addressed, the exit champion may 
have to take steps to discredit the arguments and opinions of the exit blockers by presenting 
independent investigations of the consequences of staying the course. The study suggests that exit 
champions can use legitimizers at several phases of the process and that alliances with exit catalysts 
can be utilized to support the de-escalation initiative. Finally, the exit champion should be aware of 
the role of scapegoats in successfully bringing de-escalation to completion. 
 
From a general perspective, fostering an organizational climate that is conducive to reporting bad 
news about IT projects (Tan et al., 2003) and rewards redirection or abandonment of runaway 
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projects is likely to increase the willingness of people to take on roles as messenger, exit sponsor, 
and exit champion. Furthermore, the existence of a potential exit sponsor in the form of a higher 
authority not entrapped in commitment to an escalating project (such as the Parliament’s Finance 
Committee in the VUE case) might provide a mechanism for “curbing the enthusiasm” of actors 
trapped in escalation, thereby facilitating the scripting, casting, and enactment of de-escalation. 
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Appendix A: Sample Interview Guide 
Guide for interview conducted November 14, 2003, with former managing director of the 
VUE Center 
VUE Center 
• Could you please tell us about the VUE Center; its background and the work that was 
conducted in the VUE center? 
Interview Person 
• What did your work at the VUE center encompass? 
• What was your role in the VUE Center? 
The VUE Center in the VUE project 
• When did the VUE Center enter into the picture in the VUE project? 
• Can you point out some important events on this timeline seen from the point of view of the 
VUE Center? 
• What role did the VUE center play? 
• Seen from outside you (the VUE center) seems to have had a strong interest in continuing 
the project and – if possible – making it a success. How did you conduct that role? 
Important Events 
• Could you please identify and describe some important events that influenced the 
involvement of the VUE Center in the VUE project? 
• When and how did you initiate your withdrawal from the project? – Examples of concrete 
actions? 
• What happened during the time when the VUE Center was closed down? 
The other stakeholders 
• How did you view the software supplier in relation to the de-escalation of the project? 
• How did you perceive the role of the Finance Committee? 
• How did you perceive the role of the Ministry? 
• How did you perceive the role of the Customers, i.e. the universities? 
Afterthought 
• Are there things you would have done differently today? Moments where you did not act but 
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